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6
SARKOZY'S NEW DIPLOMACY: A
REASSESSMENT OF THE THIRD RIFT IN
FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
David Drake
Though at first glance, Franco-American relations since the presidency of Charles de
Gaulle seem to represent a fifty year love/ hate relationship, they are in reality far more
complex. Georges-Henri Soutou identifies a series of rifts and reconciliations between the
two nations, culminating in the recent rift following the Iraq war (102), one that may well
be remembered in textbooks by the embarrassing appellation, the "Freedom Fries Rift".
Today, hostilities between France and America seem to be such a part of the geopolitical
status quo that they are taken for granted. For French politicians, anti-American rhetoric is
far from taboo, and snide pot shots at the Bush administration usually result in a surge of
approval. In America, the conditions are much the same, with Donald Rumsfield dismissing
France out of hand as part of an obsolete "old Europe." Condoleezza Rice was quoted as
telling the President to " punish France, ignore Germany and forgive Russia." Even former
presidential candidate Mitt Romney, who speaks fluent French and lived two years in France
during his college years, could not resist a passing remark underlining France's
unimportance on the world stage (Romney, paragraph 17). Using France as a bogeym.an has
been a cornerstone of Republican policy since 2003 (Canellos, para 2) and for many
Americans, belittling the 'cheese-eating surrender monkeys' , (a phrase first coined by The
Simpsons) pays off with an immediate surge in support.
It is clear, then, that we are experiencing a rift in relations, to put it mildly. The arrival
of President Nicholas Sarkozy adds a surprising new twist to the story. Unlike his
predecessor, Sarkozy seems enthusiastic about repairing tllls rift and makes no secret about
his adnllration for American policies and values. Those who have seen a pattern of rifts and
reconciliations may have seen Sarkozy's election as the harbinger of a third reconciliation.
Indeed, as President Bush prepared to meet with French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Maine
in August of 2007, Georgetown University professor Charles Kupchan said that there was
reason to believe the two countries would develop a reliable partnership on areas of mutual
concern, such as the humanitarian situation in Darfur, Sudan and nuclear weapons
nonproliferation . "The United States and France ought to be the closest of allies, and in fact
they were," Kupchan said, in reference to their 18th-century relationship. The two countries
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are quite similar in terms of nations . . . that see themselves as the founding nations of
liberal democracy" (Kaufinan, para. 3). Even ultra-conservative Ann Coulter, outspoken
critic of the French, goes so far as to call Sarkozy "their first pro-American ruler since Louis
XVI".1 A gross exaggeration, to be sure, but reflective of the willingness of even the
conservative pundits to forgive and forget France's supposed betrayal over the Iraq War.
Others are not so optimistic. In late 2004, French historian and political scientist,
Georges-Henri Soutou published the article: "Three Rifts, Two reconciliations: FrancoAmerican Relations During the Fifth Republic." Soutou proposes that the current rift will
be a lasting one with no reconciliation in view. He attributes this to four factors. The first
is that the French have recently changed the way they view foreign policy. They no longer
see close bilateral Franco-European cooperation as being in their best interests. The second
is that French geopolitical strategy emphasizes a united Europe, led by a Franco-German
alliance. This strategy implies a certain resistance to NATO and American unilateralism. This
leads to Soutou's third obstacle, that of idealogical differences between France and the
United States. His final obstacle is the institutional development of French domestic politics,
which structurally prevents a transatlantic rapprochement (Soutou 2004, 7) . "Thus,"
continues Soutou, "while maintaining Franco-American relations on an even keel has never
been an easy task, repairing the breach in bilateral relations occasioned by the Gulf War of
March 2003 will therefore be even more difficult than in times past" (2004, 6).
While much has been written on the subject of this rift, Soutou's article is of interest
because it not only takes a historical perspective on Franco-Anlerican relations, but does so
from the point of view of a French political scientist. Now it is 2008, and the election of
President Nicholas Sarkozy was an unforeseen political event that gives cause for a reassessment of Soutou's negative prediction on the likelihood of reconciliation. One of the
pillars of Sarkozy's foreign policy is to re-establish strong ties with the United States.
Sometimes called the anti-anti American, Sarkozy spoke across the Atlantic during his 2007
victory speech, promising "You can count on our friendship.2"While it is too early in his
presidency to examine whether or not he has been successful, we can examine each of
Soutou's four obstacles and see what Sarkozy initially has done to overcome them. If all four
issues seem on their way to resolution, America and France might actually experience a
third reconciliation in the foreseeable future.
SIGNIFICANCE

Perhaps another way to ask this question is "Why should we even care?"What does
America have to gain from getting the approval of their snobbish rivals? Why should France
try to win over the boorish Americans? As much as American tourists would enjoy
vacationing in Paris without pretending to be Canadians, there must be a more pressing
reason to attempt a transatlantic reconciliation.
If America is set on continuing its unilateral approach to foreign relations, then the
opinion of France is not a pressing concern. However, should they seek to regain moral
authority and soft power to complement their military strength, it must seek to regain the
trust of Europe. If they can silence the accusing voices of the French, they will make great
strides towards regaining their lost moral high ground as a benevolent superpower. France
has even more to gain. As Garton Ash points out, Europe would do better to befriend the
world's only hyperpuissancc, and influence its actions in this manner, than to turn them into
an enemy while trying in vain to establish themselves as a global counterweight (2004,201) .
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STATISTICAL EVIDENCE:

Because Sarkozy has only been president since May 2007, it is still too early to see all
of the statistical infonnation that would reveal improvements in the relation between France
and America. What few statistics are available seem to indicate that a positive relationship is
developing.
In 2007, despite an economic slowdown in the US. , brought on largely by the
housing market slump and the tightening of credit, the United States remained the largest
foreign investor in France. Overall, US. investment in France results in nearly 3,000
com.panies and supports 600,000 French jobs. At the same time, France is the second largest
investor in the US., supporting almost 550,000 American jobs. Approximately $1 billion in
commercial transactions take place between France and the U.S. every business day (Invest
in France Agency).
TABLE

1: U.S. TRADE

Exports
Imports
Balance

WITH FRANCE IN GOODS,

16.0 17.7 18.9
20.6 24.0 25.7
-4.6 -6.3 -6.8

1997·2005

20.4
29.8
-9.4

19.9
30.4
-10.5

19.0 17.0
28.2 29.2
-9.2 -12.2

19.6
31.5
-11.9

2005
20.7
33.5
-12.8

Source: U.S. Census Bureau
While some decrease in exports is evident in 2003, both exports and imports have
been growing since then. While these numbers do not yet show Sarkozy's influence on
trade, they do suggest that from an economic perspective, the rift following the invasion of
Iraq was short-lived (CRS Report for Congress).
In the matter of public opinion, the effects of the rift seem to be repairing themselves
as well, as this poll ofAmerican adults reveals (Gallup Poll. Feb. 11-14,2008. N=1 ,007 adults
nationwide. MoE ± 3).
"Next, I'd like your overall opinion of some foreign countries. Is your overall
opinion of [see below] very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable, or
very unfavorable?"
France
2/3-6/03
3/14-15/03
2/9-12/04
2/6-9/06
2/1-4/07
2111-14/08

Favorable
59%
34%
47%
54%
57%
69%

Unfavorable
33%
64%
49%
40%
38%
27%

The effects of the 2003 rift can be seen, from the drastic drop in opinion from
February to March. However since that time American opinion on France has been slowly
improving, culminating in an astonishing 12 point jump during Sarkozy's first year. Opinion
polls in France also indicate improvement, albeit on a slower scale. In 2004 only 17 percent
of those polled thought America's presence in Iraq was effective in combating terrorism,
compared to 80 percent who did not (TNS-Sofres 2004). In 2006, however, 37 percent of

Sarkozy's New Diplomacy

82

DAVID DRAKE

Brigham Young University

those polled thought the actions of the United States were effective in preventing terror,
while 45 percent did not (TNS-Sofres 2006). Unfortunately, data regarding French opinion
in 2007 was not available as of yet, so we cannot see Sarkozy's influence on French public
opinion regarding America. In addition, the question is about American presence in Iraq and
its role in the war on terror, not a blanket approval rating like the question to the Americans.
Still, considering that tllls is the main point of contention in the 2003 rift, this 20 percent
increase in optinllsm is pronllsing.
SOUTOU'S FOUR OBSTACLES

Foreign Relations
Sontou's first obstacle to a reconciliation is French foreign policy. He claims the
French no longer see their interest lying in a close bilateral relationslllp with the United
States, even on terms favorable to France. Tills is partly because of an emphasis on a Gaullist
policy of national independence, but even de Gaulle sought some sort of useful transatlantic
relationslllp to accom.plish this end. Soutou blames tllls sillft on the emphasis on 'multipolarity', (the word multipolairc has appeared in 152 speeches or declarations of Jacques
Chirac between Ills assumption in office in 1995 and the 2003 rift) (Soutou 2004, 7). In
essence, France sees the bipolar Cold War world slllfting towards a unipolar world where
American hegemony is unchecked. Consequently, the French see American foreign policy
as dangerous, because it leads to a 'clash of civilizations' and to instability. French foreign
policy, then, was to resist American unipolar foreign policy within a framework of
multipolar institutions, such as the European Union and the United Nations. "For the
French, 'multipolarity' is not meant to enhance or even to modify the global role of the
United States, but to reduce it, because American power and policy are currently regarded
as excessive and unbalanced" (Soutou 2004,7).
Sarkozy is realigning French foreign policy. In so doing, he is removing some points
of opposition between French and American goals. In essence, he is returning to de Gaulle's
policy of seeking closer ties with the United States, aiding the larger power wIllie at the
same time asserting French interests and opinions. Tills approach, while a drastic change
from Ills predecessors, reflects French public opinion. In September of 2004, French
newspaper Le Monde performel an opinion poll by telephone asking questions about
America and its role in the world. Of 1 ,000 people polled, 90 percent thought it important
that France develop good relations with America, willIe only 9 percent did not see tills as
important (TNS-Sofres, 2004). Sarkozy's efforts to assert French independence willIe still
seeking a useful relationship with the United States can be seen in Ills recent initiatives
regarding Iraq, Mghanistan, and Iran.
WillIe both nations disagreed over the invasion of Iraq, Sarkozy wishes France to play
a positive role in promoting regional support aimed at bolstering Iraq's sovereignty and
national reconciliation. Already in 2006, Sarkozy was causing a stir of comments when in a
speech in Waslllngton he criticized French 'arrogance' and indicated that such disagreements
among allies that led to the 2003 rift should never again become a 'crisis' (Ramsay 2007 ,
330) . Sarkozy, calling France's opposition to the American-led war in Iraq "a disagreement,"
told the French American Business Council: "I never quite understood why we had to fight
with the United States. I never quite got it. 3" In French Foreign Minister Kouchner's August
2007 visit to Baghdad, and in subsequent meetings, France has signaled that it is ready to
playa more supportive role in Iraq (Stapleton). French Ambassador Pierre Vi.m.ont had this
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to say: "We still think that no military solution can be reached in Iraq, but a political solution
is possible. France has remained in Iraq since 2003.We have an embassy there having a dialog
with the different conununities. We have said that we are ready to help, to host a political
conference with all the political communities inside Iraq to see if we can help people talk
to each other and work together to get out of the present confrontation in these
conullunities."This willingness to help shows how France is willing to work with the U.S.
in the area of foreign policy while maintaining its individual stance as a major power.
Mghanistan is another foreign policy issue in which Sarkozy has changed the status
quo to be more supportive ofAmerica. Sarkozy told members of the United States Congress
in his November 2007 speech:
From day one, France decided to participate shoulder to shoulder with you in
the war in Afghanistan. Let me tell you solemnly today: France will remain
engaged in Afghanistan as long as it takes, because what's at stake in that country
is the future of our values and that of the Atlantic Alliance. For me, failure is not
an option. Terrorism will not win because democracies are not weak, because
we are not afraid of this barbarism. America can count on France (para. 35).
Under Chirac, France often seemed to be looking for a way to get out of Afghanistan
rather than remain 4 . The national opinion was one of discouragement towards the war, and
the general feeling was that the army had lost sight of its purpose. Despite these concerns,
Sarkozy has stated that France is ready to stay as long as needed, and if necessary will increase
its military presence. According to remarks given by the French Ambassador to the United
States during a visit to Brigham Young University, this will be announced at the next NATO
sunullit.
In November of 2007, Sarkozy joined with Bush in expressing worry over the
growing assertiveness ofVladmir Putin's Russia. Here, Sarkozy is able to not only help
America attain a foreign policy goal that they have in conUllon, but also show how it can
be done through French diplomacy. Sarkozy took advantage of what he called a friendship
between France and Russia to speak to Putin about sensitive issues of media freedom,
Tehran, foreign investment, energy, and Kosov0 5 . The issue of Kosovo's independence went
quickly from a hypothetical to a reality in February of 2008. As Bush saluted Kosovo's
independence, stating that he was confident that "history will prove this to be the correct
move 6 ," Sarkozy was also recognizing Kosovo's independence and proposing the
establishment of diplomatic relations between France and Kosovo. Despite opposition from
both Belgium and the Netherlands, France has been urging Serbia to accept Kosovo's
declaration of independence and to allow Belgrade to sign a rapprochement accord with the
EU before the Serbian elections of May 2008. In the matter of Kosovo, there is once again
division among the EU member states, with six countries stating that they would not
recognize Kosovo's independence any time soon. Unlike the division that split the EU states
in 2003 over Iraq, France finds itself on the same side of the debate as America when it
comes to Kosovo 7 .
On Iran's nuclear ambitions, President Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Kouchner both
have called that country's development of nuclear weapons capability "unacceptable," and
spoken out in favor of negotiations hacked hy stiffer sanctions (Stapleton, para 12).
Washington was happy to hear Sarkozy warn French diplomats on August 27th that "an Iran
with nuclear anns is, to me, unacceptable"(Ramsay 2007 , 330) . He even went so far as to
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say that the initiative for sanctions is " the only one that can enable us to escape an alternative
that I say is catastrophic: the Iranian bomb or the bombing ofIran" (Ramsay 2007 , 330). This
tough stan ce on Iran's nuclear program, which envisions new punitive sanctions that will
hurt French business interests, is welcomed by the White House. S During his March 21st
visit to Paris, presidential candidate John McCain praised Sarkozy for his efforts in this area:
"President Sarkozy has already recommended that we join together with meaningful
sanctions on Iran that would deter them on their path of acquiring nuclear weapons," he
said . "I believe that it could be very effective and I believe President Sarkozy's leadership on
that issue is very important." It is this sort of willingness to act as an ally that caused M cCain
to add : " "I think relations with France will continue to improve no matter who is president
of the Un.ited States because this president is c0l11..l11itted to greater cooperation and values
our friendship" (Reuters, para. 3) . For his part, Sarkozy has distanced himself from the
presidential race, but promised his support to w hoever wins the Am.erican election, saying,
"R egardless of who is president -- male or female -- we will work hand in hand together."9
Sarkozy has shown that France will do m.ore than talk about supporting the United
States. At the same time, he has kept France from becoming seen as a political yes-man to
the United States by opposing Turkey's joining of the European Union, (a m ove toward
enlargement that BlISh supports) , and has even criticized Bush repeatedly for failing to make
the enviromnent a high policy priority. 10 Sarkozy has changed France's foreign policy from
one of Atlantic antagonism to that of an outspoken, yet supportive ally. In so doing, he has
taken steps to resolving Soutou's concerns about conflicting foreign policy preventing a
transatlantic reconciliation .
Geopolitical Interests
Soutou's second obstacle is French geopolitical strategy. T his strategy has long b een
one of a partnership with Germany in creating and leading a strong Europe. A common
European defense policy would be a crucial point in this. Through a united Europe, France
has hoped to influence the global community. With this goal in mind, France has long
champion ed the project of the European Union, often at the expense of support for NATO.
President Nicolas Sarkozy changed that. In his November address to Congress, he informed
the United States of his plans for NATO: "I would like France, a founding m ember of our
Alliance and already one of its largest contributors, to assume its full role in the effort to
renew NATO's instruments and means of action and, in this context, to allow its relations
with the Alliance to evolve" (para . 51) . He has again followed his words with action,
ordering his diplomats to stop obstructing NATO's work and offering to return France to
NATO 's military structures (Valasek, para 1) . Ambassador Villmont affirmed that France is
"getting our officers back into the military organization ... at the same pace as increasing the
European defense" .
As Sarkozy campaigned for his election, one of the geopolitical areas he promised to
reform was inunigration. During campaign speeches, he promised to create a ministry of
inunigration and national identity, to control inunigration, especially from Francophone
Mrica. H e has promised a radical reorientation of the French position in geopolitics, a
system that has previously been criticized as an interventionist policy of "propping up
dictators and tolerating bad governance" (Mbataru, 2007, para 6). Sarkozy promised to break
from " old thinking" , taking a stand against French companies that encourage corruption in
Mrica. In so doing, France would be joining the Americans (and the British) in putting
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pressure on corrupt African regimes. This could lead to increased transatlantic cooperation
in coordinating policies in Africa, a continent in which France, with its legacy of 14 former
Mrican colonies, still has a great deal of influence.
Sarkozy also presents strong support for Israel, a decision not always politically
prudent in a nation with a growing Muslim population that already measures five to ten
percent of the population (CIA Factbook 2006). "I have a reputation of being a friend of
Israel, and it's true," he said. "I will never compromise on Israel's security" (Ramsay 2007,
330) . Though this geopolitical promise of support is sure to please the United States, Israel's
long-time ally, it causes critics to point to Sarkozy's lnixed Hungarian and Jewish ancestry
as defining foreign policy.
The fact that Sarkozy is reevaluating French geopolitical strategy is not surprising.
Soutou himself expresses doubts on the sustain ability of the French geopolitical strategy of
a Franco-German alliance leading Europe. "In the final analysis Germany does not share the
French foreign policy agenda: while Berlin certainly wishes to redress the balance inside the
Alliance, it will not be anxious to create a new imbalance for the benefit of the French"
(Soutou, 11). In addition, there are many in France who have expressed strong doubts about
Germany, believing it seeks to create a European Union along the lines of the German
federal model. French geopolitical goals were already being scrutinized before Sarkozy took
office. Under Sarkozy, they are being re-assessed and altered into something far less
antagonistic to American objectives.
Ideology
Third, Soutou suggests that a fundamental difference in ideology prevents France and
A,merica from reconciliation. A current trend in French political thought is to view
American values not as 'republican' but as 'Anglo-Saxon', putting them in contrast with
European values(Soutou, 2004, 10). A lniStruSt of globalization and market liberalism has
made many French suspicious of the dog-eat-dog capitalism of the U.S. A GlobeScan poll
of 20 countries around the world conducted between June and August 2005 showed that
the French public is unusually skeptical about the free enterprise economic system. A
majority or plurality of 19 out of 20 countries agreed with the statement "The free
enterprise system and free market economy is the best system on which to base the future
of the world." France alone had a minority, 36 percent, agreeing with the statement, while
50 percent disagreed. This is in stark contrast with the United States, where 71 percent
agreed, while 24 percent disagreed (Stephens, 2006, para 7). French politicians, therefore,
have long prOlnised to protect its citizens from the effects of globalization. This has since
evolved into a concept of "managed globalization", the idea that
France should legislate and control globalization to protect France from the negative
while embracing the trade benefits (Abdelal and Meunier, 2). While in France, even today,
it is "more popular to denounce the ravages of Jungle capitalism' or the 'dictatorship of the
stockholders' than it is to praise the free market" (Meunier 2003, 22), French political and
business leaders have realized that a dominant state role in running the economy is no
longer possible in a European single market and a globalizing world. We have already seen
that France is very open to trade, and its combined exports and imports made up nearly 50
percent of its GDP in 1997. Despite its lip service about protectionism, France remains the
world's fourth largest exporter and has enjoyed a trade surplus since 1993 (Meunier 2003,
22). Sarkozy's France is seeking to "borrow American technology and economic practice;
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buy American products; imitate American social policy; even dress, speak, and (perhaps worst
of all) eat like Americans and yet not lose their Frenchness" (Kuisel, 1993,3).
Another fundamental idealogical difference between the two nations is a religious
one. While both France and the U.S. have a political tradition of separating church and state,
the French see this secularization of the state as an important cornerstone of French identity.
This tradition of laidte, or secularism, has been cemented in the law of 1905, but can be
traced back to the French Revolution. "To this day, anything that smacks of official
recognition of a religion - such as allowing Islamic headscarves in schools - is anathema to
many French people."ll In fact, the law approved by Chirac in 2004 banned all religious
symbols frOiTl schools. This atmosphere of strict secularization makes som.e French
conUTlentators gaze incredulously over the ocean to see politicians campaigning from the
pulpits of churches and speaking publicly of their faith in God. To print "In God We Trust"
on our currency seems paradoxical to a country that sees a separation of church and state as
an unapproachable divide cemented in law.
Here again, Sarkozy is seeking to change ingrained French ideology. His D ecember
2007 visit to Pope Benoit XVI marked the beginning of a campaign to reintroduce religion
into the public sphere. His goal is to reunite the secular Republic with the Catholic church,
an objective that seems Herculean when one considers France's post revolutionary history.
" France's roots are essentially Christian," he announced in la discours du Latran, going on to
explain that Catholicism and the ethical values that come with it helped to form France's
culture and moral values. 12 To speak so openly about religion is a huge taboo, a subject
Mitterrand and Chirac left alone. To French sensibilities, religion is a matter of personal
conviction, and for a public figure . to actively promote religion is the secular equivalent of
bla~phemy. Understandably, this effort at reforming the very cultural climate of France is
already meeting with waves of criticism. 13
Why is he attempting what even the administrative genius of Napoleon failed to do,
that is to reunite 'Ics deux Frances' of modern republican values and ancient ecclesiastical
traditions? One could be justified in pointing out that overcoming idealogical barriers
between France and the United States is not Sarkozy's goal in attempting this religious
renaissance. Indeed, Sarkozy gives different reasons, saying that, in wake of rising antiChristian sentiments, France could profit from what he calls 'Iaidte positive', or a sense of
esteem for spiritual currents in political life, as well as the effect they have on the national
concept of what is 'moral' .14 Whether or not Sarkozy's motives even tangentially include a
rapprochement with American values, his success in this endeavor would help overcome an
ideological distance between the two nations and therefore help resolve Soutou's third
obstacle. A better argument would be to question the feasibility of this religious revival. In
all honesty, I doubt Sarkozy's efforts will be able to accomplish what over two hundred years
of secularization have cemented into society. Without discounting the possibility that some
increase in spirituality may take place, it seems for now that the religious idealogical
differences between France and the U.S. will outlast Sarkozy's presidency.
In the arena of the economy, Sarkozy seems to be experiencing more success. He
campaigned on the theme that "the French will have to work harder." In his September 18,
2007 speech to the Senate, he criticized provisions in the French pensions system and
attacked the 35-hour work week. While not embracing the same market liberalism as
America, Sarkozy is clearly pushing France closer in that direction than it has ever been
before. The policy of managed globalization helps paint a less threatening picture of
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American style capitalism. While still nothing to be embraced, it is no longer something to
be feared. Sarkozy has three main tenets of economic reform: revamp French overtime, make
mortgage interest deductible, and abolish the 35 hour workweek while decreasing corporate
taxes. These changes are luring businesses back to France (Steiner 2007, 162). Sarkozy also
proposed that employers pay a 25% premium for work beyond 35 hours a week, but be
exempt from social taxes on overtime wages. In the same vein, enlployees would pay no
income tax on their overtime wages. "This will boost productivity, but it will also change
the mind-set of France's workforce," e'xplains Philippe Favre, chief executive of Invest in
France Agency. "The French, when they work, are quite productive--in production per hour
they are second in Europe to Norway," says Favre, who notes that the most productive
French workers will likely get the most overtime (Steiner 2007 , 162). While foreign
investors poured into France in record numbers in 2007, ($88 billion worth, with a quarter
of that coming from the United States), economists predict that a significant economic boost
from Sarkozy's reforms will not occur until after 2008 (Steiner, 2007,163). These reforms
do more than simply revitalize the French economy, they change the French ideology to
one that sees American-style economics not as a nightmare, but as a model that can be
adopted to a Gallic social system.
His drive for economic reform is unsurprising. Unlike the majority of past French
presidents, Sarkozy did not attend the elite Ecole Nationale d'Administration, and therefore
did not inherent a dirigiste reflex. He has what the Economist calls "Gaullist faith in the state
[mixed] with a tinge of industrial romanticism" . 15 This combination of philosophies makes
Sarkozy see American economic ideals in a different, and more sympathetic light.
His November victory over the transportation and subway strikes is a direction of the
success he is experiencing in this area. Though transportation workers went on strike for ten
days after Sarkozy announced his proposed pension changes for rail workers, he held firm
to the promised reforms. This was an important victory for Sarkozy, as he proved that the
French government could create reforms in spite of powerful worker's unions. 16 While
France is still a long way off from mirroring American ideals of free-market liberalism, their
economic policies are far less dirigiste than the double-talk of French politicians would have
us believe. Sarkozy is closing the idealogical gap that Soutou sees as an obstacle to
reconciliation.
Domestic Politics
Finally, Soutou suggests that a structural problem exists in France that makes it
impossible for an openly pro-American candidate or party to gain power. Though Soutou
estimates that approximately one third of French political elites do not desire permanent
tension with Washington, they no longer have the constituency to influence positive change.
A long period of unemployment has destroyed the brief acceptance of liberalism that was
present in the early 90's. In addition, recent inmugration to France is largely anti-American,
due to their sympathies with the Palestinians (Soutou 11). This explains the advice Sarkozy
received that his pro-American presidential campaign was doomed to failure (Vimont).
Despite these obstacles, Sarkozy was elected. Political historian Nick Hewlett
attributes his victory to the notion of Bonapartism, which can be simplified as follows: An
authoritarian but charismatic leader is able to rule with an unusual degree of popularity for
a relatively short period of time by claiming to be above party politics. Due to chaos among
the established political forces, the leader is able to present himself as a populist, with
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popularity spanning all classes. He tends to speak of nationalism and national unity, of
modernisation and progress whilst conserving all that is seen as valuable in the past (the
concept of 'managed globalization' being a prime exam.ple).The circumstances which bring
a Bonapartist leader to power and allow them to rule are exceptional, or characterised by
crisis, and the threat of return to crisis or instability if the leader departs (Hewlett 2007,406).
In other words, Sarkozy was elected partly because of dissatisfactio n with the current
government, and partly b ecause of his own rhetoric, preaching a rupture with the traditions
of Chirac and Mitterrand . One small aspect of this rupture was a promise to renew a
friendship with America. Sarkozy nonchalantly remarked to the American Business Council
that during his presidential campaign, h e said he "was a friend of America, and with that,
they elected m e -- not bad." 17
It would be presumptuous to suppose that his election represents a mandate from the
people to pursue a rapprochement with the United States. Still, the fact rem ains that his
opponent, Royal, made much of Sarkozy's pro-American sympathies both in foreign affairs
and in his 'Anglos- Saxon' economic reformist ideology. According to the Guardian, the
French see Sarkozy and his wife as 'very American' and 'd la Kennedy' (Singer 2007, 188).
N o matter how large a factor his love of America was in the election, his victory proves that
Soutou's obstacle of domestic politics was not enough to prevent a pro-American candidate
from gaining office. Though the French political stru cture in 2004 made such an event
unlikely, the appearance of a candidate using Bonapartist campaign strategies made it
possible to use a populist mandate for change and surmount these obstacles. Hewlett
reminds us, however, that "Bonapartism is, and always has been, inherently unstable, because
it is belt on flimsy bases" (418). Because the voters' decisions are based largely on emotional
rhetoric rather than long-term policy plans , Sarkozy's power is volatile. Already, recent data
shows Sarkozy's support has since waned, though this is attributed not to his pro-American
policies, but rather by the public way he conducted his love life and the rising cost ofliving
(Reuters, para 2).
CONClUSION

Professor Barnett Singer contends that French public opinion of the United States
was already improving before Sarkozy took office, and that his victory is just further proof
that the so-called third rift was vastly over-exaggerated. Despite the tired examples of
differences in high p olitics, he claims that the average French person maintained positive
feelings towards the United States . He gives several alternative explanations for
improvements in French public opinion that predate Sarkozy's election. One reason he
attributes to the massive migration from the Third World into France over the last fifteen
years (Singer 2007 , 189). This influx of visible minorities makes America seem like a lifeline
of h ope, a nation with a melting pot legacy that has become all the stronger for it. A second
reason is France's infatuation with American culture, a guilty pleasure that outwardly
condemns the Coca-colonization of the world w hile at the same time indulges in blue jeans,
American style cell-phones, backpacks, internet culture (complete with a French E-Bay,
Yahoo, and Amazon) , novels, and even tennis shoes (Singer 2007 , 190) . He shows how the
French have taken to following American trends in psychology, urban development, and
have even taken to indulging in American-style political correctness, (a large change for a
country once famous for speaking its mind without regard to bruised feelings).These are all
proofs that Singer offers to show that France has been eager for good relations with America
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long before the advent of Sarkozy. These trends correlate with the previously mentioned
opinion poll, where 90 percent of the French polled desired France to improve its
transatlantic relations.
Singer's theory adds credence to my own. I do not seek to prove that Sarkozy single
handedly turned the tide of French opinion, merely that he is making a reconciliation
between the two nations more likely. After less than a year in office, Sarkozy has already
begun to address each ofSoutou's four obstacles to reconciliation. While it remains too early
to hang a "Mission Accomplished" banner over Sarkozy's struggle to improve
Francol American relations, early signs all point to success. He is redirecting French foreign
policy along a course less at odds with America. He is redefining French geopolitical
interests to include NATO's success in addition to the C0I111nOn European Defense Policy.
He is seeking to change the economic ideals of France, creating a more open, hard-working
and even religious society? Finally, he has used Bonapartist campaign strategies to overcome
the structural obstacles to gaining power that Soutou predicted would prevent a proAmerican party from rising. In addition, early statistical evidence suggests that relations
between France and America are improving after a clear dip in 2003.
President Sarkozy concluded his remarks to Congress by reaffirming his conviction to
reconcile the two nations:
I want to be your friend, your ally and your partner. But a friend who stands
on his own two feet . An independent ally. A free partner. . .It is this ambitious
France that I have come to present to you today. A France that comes out to
meet America to renew the pact of friendship and the alliance that Washington
and Lafayette sealed in Yorktown. Together let us be worthy of their example,
let us be equal to their ambition, let us be true to their memories! Long live the
United States of America! Vive la France! Long live French-American
friendship! (para. 54)
From his actions during his first year in office, it is clear that Sarkozy is willing to
follow these words with substantial action. A third reconciliation may not be as unattainable
as Soutou predicted in 2004. The 'hyper-president' Sarkozy has done far more than simply
spending his vacation time in America. He has become an unexpected instrument for
change. Whether he is ultimately successful remains to be seen, but he has certainly taken
the first steps towards his goal of a restored Franco-American alliance.
END NOTES

1. Human Events; 051 14/2007.Vol. 63, Issue 17, p 6
2. Wall Street Journal (Europe); 05/0712007.
3.The New York Times; 11/07/2007,Vo1.157 Issue 54121,pA3
4.The New York Times; 12/ 18/2006,Vo1.156 Issue 53797, pAlO
5. Associated Press Worldstream; 10/ 09 / 2007, "Sarkozy Urges Russia to embrace
democracy and media freedom"
6. BBC News; 02/ 19/ 2008 , "Bush Salutes Kosovo Independence"
7. International Herald Tribune; 02 / 1812008, "Behind the scenes, EU splits over Kosovo"
8.The New York Til11.es; 11 / 0712007,Vol. 157 Issue 54121, pA3
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.

Sarkozy's New Diplomacy

90

DAVID DRAKE Brigham Young University

11 . BBC News; 09/ 01 / 2004 "The deep roots of French secularism"
12. Le Monde; 1212112997 . "Nicholas Sarkozy veut remettre la religion au coeur de la
vie de la cite"
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Economist; 6130 / 2007,Vol. 383 Issue 8535, p58-59 , 2p, lc
16.The New York Times; 1112412007,Vol.I57 Issue 54l38,pA6
17.The New York Times; l1 / 07 / 2007 ,Vol.l57 Issue 54121,pA3
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdelal, Rawi and Sophie Meunier. "The Paradox of Managed Globalization," Princeton
University, http ://www.princeton.edu/ ~smeunierl Abdelal%20and%20Meunier. pdf
(accessed March 28,2008).
Associated Press. "France to Pull Troops Fighting Against Taliban In Mghanistan" The New
York Times ,Vol. 156 Issue 53797, pAlO.
Astier, Henri. "The deep roots of French secularism," BBC News Online.
http: // news. bbc.co. uk/ 1/ hil worldl europe/3325285.sun (accessed April 11 , 2008)
Canellos, Peter S. "Why Romney should not revisit France." The Boston Globe.
http://www.iht.com/ articlesI2007 / 03 / 06 / opinionl edcanellos. php (accessed March
27,2008).
Carvajal, Doreen. "Strike Across France Winds Down." The New York Times. Volume 157,
Issue 54138 (November 2007) p A6 .
Castle, Stephen. "Behind the scenes, EU split over Kosovo." International H erald Tribune.
0211812008. http: //www.ihi.com/ articlesI2008/ 02/ 18/ europe/ diplo.php (accessed
April 12,2008).
Charlton, Angela. "Sarkozy urges Russia to embrace democracy and media freedom."
Associated Press Worldstream. 10/ 10/ 2007 .
Coulter, Ann. "France Finally Gets It." Human Events. Volume 63 , Issue 17 (May 2007): 6.
CRS Report for Congress. "U.S.-French COl11l11ercial Ties." http://www.ambafranceus.orglfranceus/ USJrenchrelations1.pdf (accessed March 28,2008).
Gallup Poll. "Nations." http: // www.pollingreport.com/ nations.htm. (accessed March 21,
2008) .
Garton Ash, Timothy. Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the JillCst. New
York:Vintage Books, 2004.
H ewlett, Nick. " Nicholas Sarkozy and the Legacy of Bonapartism. The French Presidential
and Parliamentary Elections of 2007," Modern and Contemporary France 15, no. 4
(November 2007): 405-422.
Invest in France Agency. "Press Release: U .S. Maintains its Lead Among Foreign Investors
in France." http://www.ambafrance-us.org/ news/ statmntsI2008/ BilanUS2007 .pdf
(accessed March 28,2008).
Kaufinan, Stephen. "France's Sarkozy May Help Turn Page on Franco-American
Relations." America.gov-Telling America's Story.
http: //www.america.gov Ist/ washfileenglish/20071 August/2007081 01637 44esnamfu
akO .90086.hnnl. (accessed March 27,2008).
Kuisel, Richard E Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1993. http://ark.cdlib.org/ark: / 13030Ift4wl0060w/

https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2008/iss1/8

Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union

91

"L'image des Etats-Unis aupres des Franpis."TNS-Sofres. http: // www.tnssofres.coml etudesl poll 151 004_etats-unis_r.htm (accessed April 12, 2008).
Mbataru, Patrick. "What Sarkozy Means for the Continent." The Nation (Kenya) (May
2007). (Accessed via LexisNexis on April 11th, 2008).
Meunier, Sophie. "France's Double Talk on Globalization." French Politics, Culture & Society
Vol. 21, No.1, (Spring 2003).
Ramsay, Allen. "France's New President." Contemporary Review 289, no. 1686 (November
2007): 323-334.
Reuters. "McCain praises Sarkozy over ·Iran sanctions." Reuters.
http: // www.reuters.com/ article/ poIiticsNews/ idUSL216107620080321 ?feedType=
RSS&feedNam.e=politicsN ews&pageNum.ber= 1&virtualBrandChannel = 10112.
3/ 30108 (accessed March 28, 2008).
R euters. "Sarkozy's popularity slumps further: French poll." Reuters.
http: // www.reuters.com /a rticle / worldNews/idUSPAB00388020080219~feedType=

RSS&feedName=worldNews (accessed March 28 , 2008).
Romney, Mitt. "Mitt Romney Suspends Campaign (Transcript)." The New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/0 2/07 lus/politics/08romneytranscript.html?ex= 1203138000&en =c6eb43c9d53f694b&ei = 5070&emc=eta 1
3/ 30108 (accessed March 28,2008).
Sarkozy, N icholas. " Renewing the French-American Alliance." Speech given to Congress,
11 / 07 / 2007. Transcript found:
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/ articlesI2007 111 I the_frenchamerican_alliance_is.
html (accessed March 30,2008).
Sarkozy, Nicholas. Speech to the French Senate, 911812007. Audio file.
http://www.npr.org/ templates/story Istory.php?storyId= 14509757 (accessed March
28,2008).
Singer, Barnett. "American Images in Today's France," Contemporary Review 289, no. 1685
Ouly 2007): 188-196.
Scioli no, Elaine. "Sarkozy throws open his arms to Bush, and the U.S." The New York Times
157, 54121 (Nov 7, 2007):A3(L)
Soutou, Georges-Henri, "Three rifts, two reconciliations: Franco-American relations
during the Fifth R epublic," The Atlantic Alliance Under Stress : US-European R elations
qfter Iraq . Cambridge University Press 2005.
Stapleton, Roberts. U.S. Ambassador to France. "The New Openness in US-French
Relations." Embassy of the United States in France Webpage.
http://213.198.100.51/ambassadorlspeechesI2007 /fallambcouncil.htm. (accessed
March 28, 2008).
Steiner, Christopher. "Vive la Diffhence," Forbes 180, no. 2 Ouly 2007):162-164.
"The Sarko Show" The Econom·;st 383, no. 8535 Oune 2007) : 58.
" The World Factbook."The Central Intelligence Agency.
https:/ I www.cia.gov/ Iibrary/ publications/ the-world-factbookl geosl fr.html
(accessed April 13,2008) .
Valasek, Thomas. "France, NATO, and European Defense." Centre for European Reform.
http: //www.cer.org. uk/ pdflpolicybrieCeu_nato_26march08. pdf (accessed March
28,2008).
Vimont, Pierre. French Ambassador to the U.S. Remarks given to Brigham Young

Sarkozy's New Diplomacy

92

DAVID DRAKE Brigham Young University

University Students 3124/08.
Wall Street Journal, "President Sarkozy." May 7,2007, Europe, http :// www. proquest.com/
(accessed April 7, 2008).

https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2008/iss1/8

